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WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS: THE CHANGING
LANDSCAPE OF FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY
Kevin K. Washburn∗
INTRODUCTION
For nearly two hundred years, the United States has been deemed
to have legal and moral obligations to the American Indian nations
that shared North America — sometimes voluntarily, sometimes not —
with immigrants. Today, these various federal obligations, collectively
known as “treaty and trust responsibilities,” are no less weighty as the
United States has grown to become the richest economy in the world.
However, the boundaries of these responsibilities as well as their content have evolved dramatically with changes in federal policy in recent
decades.
For much of American history, the federal trust responsibility was
characterized by broadening federal administrative control over Indian
tribes, with federal officials making most of the important decisions on
Indian reservations and diminishing tribal governmental authority.
More recently, however, federal control has been receding and giving
way to a gradual restoration of tribal authority. More and more, the
federal government defers to tribal priorities and tribal decisionmaking. While this development has been positive for tribes, it has
come at a cost.
As tribal control has increased, courts have been less willing to hold
the federal government responsible for its actions (and inactions) in
Indian country. Indeed, if the most compelling way to determine the
measure of a responsibility is to weigh the costs of its breach, the federal trust responsibility has been diminished. Judicial enforcement of
the trust responsibility today is more rare and limited in scope.
Proclaiming the death of the trust responsibility, however, is premature. While courts have narrowed the legal enforceability of the trust
responsibility to tribes, the political branches have expanded the meaning of the trust responsibility. Congress and the President have invigorated it with increased federal funding to provide the services and
programs required to meet it. They have also settled dozens of breachof-trust actions by tribes that might otherwise have been successfully
defended by the federal government in the courts. In some ways,
meaningful fulfillment of the federal trust responsibility has been relocated from the courts to the political branches.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
*
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More importantly, the political branches have come to view the
content of the trust responsibility differently. The obligations under
the federal trust responsibility have evolved from a paternalistic model
in which the federal government provides services and programs and
makes decisions for impoverished Native Americans, to an understanding that the trust responsibility obliges the federal government to
support and revitalize tribal governments and even advocate and protect tribal sovereign powers. Congress and the executive branch have
restored tribal powers, for example, by broadly recognizing tribal felony criminal jurisdiction over American Indians1 and even recognizing
limited tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,2 reversing
longstanding federal policy.
More importantly, in place of federal programs and services, the
last fifty years have been characterized by the growth of federal contracting with tribes to perform federal trust functions. Today, billions
of dollars of federal appropriations are spent not by the federal government, but by tribes that have contracted to provide federal services
to Indian people through so-called “tribal self-determination contracts.” In other words, tribes are being paid by the federal government to exercise federal governance powers over Indian lands and
people.
In general, the new model has been very successful. As tribal governmental powers have increased and tribes have entered contracts to
perform more federal functions, tribal governments have proven more
institutionally competent than the federal government in serving
Indian people.3 Consequently, while federal judicial interpretations of
the trust responsibility have rendered the federal government less legally accountable to Indian people, the political branches have shifted
these responsibilities to tribal governments that are much more accountable to Indian people. Today, on many reservations, the United
States has been relegated to “principal underwriter” of many of the
services required under the trust responsibility.4 As the federal trust
responsibility has come to be seen in this new light, Indian people have
gained greater control over their own destinies.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1 Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. VII, § 234, 124 Stat. 2258,
2279–80 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012)) (restoring tribal felony jurisdiction over
Indians).
2 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, tit. IX, sec. 904,
§ 204(b)(1), 127 Stat. 54, 121 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1) (Supp. I 2014)) (restoring tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit certain acts of domestic violence on Indian
lands).
3 See generally Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 709 (2006).
4 And on some reservations, due to gaming or natural resources, the federal government is no
longer even the “principal” underwriter.
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The restoration of tribes to functional sovereigns with broad powers funded by congressional appropriations under the federal trust responsibility, however, necessarily raises new issues. As tribal governments have begun to exercise substantial power, tribal decisions have
begun to have more significant consequences and have produced confusion about federal and tribal roles and responsibilities. For example,
should the federal government be liable to Indian people for actions of
the tribal government? And what is the obligation of a tribal government to its own people and others for human rights violations and
other wrongs? As tribal powers have grown, federal policy has come
full circle, with some commentators asking for new federal oversight of
tribal governments.
This Essay briefly explains federal Indian policy at this point in
history and looks to the future. Part I traces the recent rise of tribal
self-governance. Part II traces the development of the trust responsibility and its recent diminishment in the courts. Part III explains what
these countervailing developments mean for the trust doctrine today
and explain how it has evolved to support tribal self-governance and a
remarkable tribal renaissance. This Part also identifies the important
new norms that have displaced paternalism in federal Indian policy.
Part IV explains how vestiges of paternalism continue to cast a shadow over true tribal self-governance as the new self-governance model
has posed new obstacles and subjected tribes to new scrutiny. Finally,
it identifies some of the harder questions — and competing interests —
tribes must confront as more powerful self-governing sovereigns.
I. THE RENAISSANCE IN TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE
After more than two centuries of persisting side by side with the
federal government, tribal governments in the United States today
have more authority and relative economic power than any time since
the earliest days of that relationship. Tribes have been experiencing a
renaissance, not just economically, but culturally and governmentally.
How did this come to be?
In the broad arc of history, the tribal renaissance was somewhat
unexpected, at least to those unacquainted with tribal nations.
Through a series of federal Indian policies, the United States sought to
displace or even to exterminate Indian people, and ultimately, after
admitting defeat in these more aggressive efforts, to assimilate Indian
people into the broader polity by distributing their property and giving
them American citizenship.5 Yet Indian tribes survived all of these ef–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
5 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.06, at 84–93 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012 ed.) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK].
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forts. As the United States pursued manifest destiny, Indian people
and their governing traditions persisted.
While Indian persistence underlies the modern renaissance in tribal
governments, its federal roots spring from the Indian Reorganization
Act of 19346 (IRA), characterized as the “Indian New Deal.” In the
IRA, Congress explicitly rejected previous federal efforts to allot
Indian lands and eviscerate tribal governments. The IRA encouraged
tribes to adopt constitutional forms of government, and it created tools
for tribal economic development, such as federally chartered
corporations.7
The IRA represented a rare moment in American history. At a
time of American humility in the wake of the Great Depression, the
IRA represented federal acknowledgement of the limits of federal
power in addressing “the Indian question” and underscored the crucial
role of tribal governments in serving Indian people. For federal policy,
it expressed an updated view of the federal trust responsibility.
The IRA approach was controversial and was spearheaded by federal officials who embraced views that were perhaps more progressive
than the views of most American people. While the IRA was never
repealed and indeed most of its provisions remain in effect today, it
was short lived and followed soon after World War II by an effort,
partially successful, to terminate many tribal governments and fully
assimilate Indian people.8
Over the more recent past, since the 1960s and ’70s, Congress and
the executive branch have returned to the New Deal Era’s embrace of
tribal governments first seen in the IRA. The idea began with President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty and the much broader notion
that poor communities should be empowered to lift themselves up.9 In
the early days of the War on Poverty, federal policy was not so much
seeking to embrace tribal sovereignty as support grassroots community
action organizations by empowering them to be creative in finding
ways to lift their communities from poverty. Federal policymakers did
not trust entrenched local governments to accomplish these objectives
so they reached out beyond mayors and city administrations to community groups. Tribal communities were swept up in these efforts and
obtained funding precisely because they were not conceived of as entrenched, established governments. It was President Nixon’s administration that focused the grassroots self-determination idea very spe–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
6 Pub. L. No. 73-383, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479
(2012)).
7 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 5, § 1.05, at 79–84.
8 See id § 1.06, at 84–93.
9 Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 777,
788–91 (2006).
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cifically on Indian tribes and began again to treat tribes as governments.10
The first major piece of legislation developed under this new approach was Public Law 93-638, the Indian Self-Determination Act of
1975.11 Under this law, Indian tribes could contract to run Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) services or Indian Health Service (IHS) programs
for their own tribal members. Under such a contract, known as a “638
contract” or “self-determination contract,” a tribe would step into the
shoes of the federal government and use tribal employees to run federal programs with federal funding. Under such a contract, a tribe
would receive the federal government’s share of the agency’s appropriation for this work, which primarily covered employee salaries.
Implementing the new policy was difficult at first. The BIA was
more than a century old. Any dramatic change to a government agency with such an established culture would have been challenging, but
the difficulty of this initiative was exacerbated by the fact that BIA officials who negotiated tribal self-determination contracts were sometimes negotiating the end of their own employment, at least at their
present location. This dampened the enthusiasm among some federal
employees. Over the long term, however, even the BIA has embraced
the contracting of federal functions on Indian reservations by Indian
tribes. (The IHS seems to remain somewhat resistant, perhaps because
the culture in which doctors and healthcare professionals live inculcates a deep personal responsibility for saving the world one human
being at a time and resists contracting out that very important mission.)
Gradually, the tribal self-determination program was broadened
and recast as “self-governance.”12 Today, this new approach is widely
hailed as a significant improvement in federal Indian policy and a central driver of the decades-long renaissance of tribal governments. In
2015, tribes have contracted around $1.6 billion in programs from the
Indian Health Services.13 Measured by appropriations, over one-third
of IHS’s programs are now being contracted and run by Indian tribes
themselves.14 The federal workforce has adjusted accordingly. To illustrate the scope of changes, note that in 1983, the BIA directly em–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
10 Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 564, 564–67, 576
(July 8, 1970) [hereinafter Special Message on Indian Affairs].
11 More formally known as the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub.
L. No. 98-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–450n, 455–458e).
12 See Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of Tribal
Self-Governance Under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 39 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 29–40 (2014–15).
13 Id. at 49.
14 See id.
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ployed approximately 15,000 people.15 As of 2014, employment for the
BIA and a sister agency, the Bureau of Indian Education, totaled approximately 8700, even though appropriations had increased even in
real dollars over the same period of time.16
While federal self-determination laws provided a more favorable
institutional structure in which tribal governments could thrive within
the American system, Indian gaming has underwritten some of their
success, at least for more than one-third of American Indian tribes17
that have gaming operations. Indeed, for some tribes, the revenues
from contracting for federal programs pales in comparison to revenues
from Indian gaming, which developed in the 1970s and 1980s, and has
become a nearly $30 billion industry.18 Gaming revenues allow some
tribes to supplement their federal contract funds substantially.19
As a result of these positive developments at the tribal level and, in
part, because of the power of economic resources in our political system, the federal political branches have responded. While the United
States, since its first Indian treaties, has had a “government-togovernment” relationship with tribes, the relationship has become
more meaningful and somewhat more equal. Under the federal policies of self-determination and self-governance, the tribal role in implementing federal responsibilities was broadened beyond the Indian
programs at the Department of the Interior and the Indian Health
Service at Health and Human Services in the 1980s and 1990s, to other agencies of Interior, such as the Bureau of Land Management, the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
15 4 HISTORY OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS 275 (Wilcomb E. Washburn ed., 1988) (“In
1983, it was estimated that more than 80 percent of some 15,000 Bureau [of Indian Affairs] employees were Indian.”).
16 See INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION: FISCAL YEAR 2014 app. 1, https://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs
/groups/xocfo/documents/text/idc1-021730.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QFY-GPCM] (reporting that the
BIA staffed 9044 employees in 2012 and 8677 employees in 2014).
17 News Release, Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, Live from Indian Country, the NIGC Announces Largest Tribal Revenue Gain in 10 Years (July 19, 2016), http://www.nigc.gov/news
/detail/live-from-indian-country-the-nigc-announces-largest-tribal-revenue-gain-in [https://perma
.cc/CQK9-QZ98] (noting that 238 [of the 567] tribes have gaming operations).
18 NAT’ L INDIAN GAMING COMM’ N, GROSS GAMING REVENUE TRENDING, https://
www.nigc.gov/images/uploads/reports/2015_Gross_Gaming_Revenue_Trending.pdf [https://perma
.cc/3C9M-CX9E].
19 For some tribes, Indian gaming provides far more revenues than the federal government
ever provided. Federal appropriations through the Department of the Interior (representing the
Bureaus of Indian Affairs and Indian Education), the Department of Health and Human Services
(representing the Indian Health Service), and the Department of Housing and Urban Development for Indian housing programs, which account for the largest federal programs, together reach
less than $10 billion annually in comparison to nearly $30 billion in gaming revenues. Id. Gaming monies are much less evenly distributed than federal program funds, of course, because revenues vary dramatically among gaming tribes and the majority of tribes do not engage in gaming
at all.
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Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service,20 and also to
other cabinet-level agencies, such as the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA),21 and even the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).22 For many EPA programs, tribes may be treated
“as states” for purposes of setting standards and operating programs.
Congress appropriates approximately $650 million each year to HUD
to support tribally run housing programs.23 In recent years, Congress
has restored the right of tribal governments to exercise felony tribal
criminal jurisdiction over their own members and other Indians.24 It
has even restored criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in a narrow
range of circumstances.25 And while tribes can contract to run federal
programs under federal standards as discussed above, Congress has, in
some cases, enacted laws that authorize tribes to replace federal standards with their own tribal standards.26
Tribes have responded positively to the expansion of power. Indeed, tribes have agitated for more and more authority. Many tribes
long ago developed capacities far beyond any perceived need for the
“federal control” aspects of the trusteeship.27 Indeed, in business negotiations or litigation with the federal government, it is not unusual for
a tribe to have professional representatives and employees who are
equal to the talent on the federal side of the table.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
20 Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250
(noting that the act was designed “to provide for tribal Self-Governance”); see also Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102
Stat. 2285, 2296; Strommer & Osborne, supra note 12, at 38–39.
21 See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2012) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11(b)(1) (2012) (Safe
Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9626(a) (Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act).
22 Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA), 25
U.S.C. §§ 4101–4243 (2012). NAHASDA established a single federal flexible block grant for tribes
or tribally designated housing entities to design and administer housing assistance to tribal members. Id. § 4111.
23 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., FY 2013 BUDGET 9 (2013) (“The Budget provides $650 million for the Native American Housing Block Grant program, which will provide
much-needed funds to more than 550 Tribes to help mitigate severe housing needs and overcrowding on reservations.”).
24 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b).
25 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, tit. IX, sec. 904,
§ 204(b)(1), 127 Stat. 54, 121 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1) (Supp. I 2014)) (restoring tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit certain acts of domestic violence on Indian
lands).
26 See, e.g., HEARTH Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-151, 126 Stat. 1150 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 415) (creating voluntary alternative business leasing options for tribes where tribes can negotiate
and enter into leases without further approval).
27 Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 317,
335 (2006) (“In large measure, Tribes and their members have been relieved of the intrusive federal presence of the past with no withdrawal of federal support . . . .” (quoting Special Message on
Indian Affairs, supra note 10, at 567)).
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As a result of a significant federal political commitment to tribal
self-governance, complemented by successful economic development
for some tribes, tribal governments have seen a major resurgence in
authority and legitimacy. While the sovereign status quo ante, prior to
the arrival of Columbus in the Western Hemisphere, may be impossible for tribes to achieve, tribal governments are now much more fully
woven into the tapestry of federal, state, and local governmental institutions that cover the United States. Indeed, at least some tribal governments are stronger now than they have ever been in the history of
the United States. As a result of the tribal renaissance, Indian people
have seen dramatic improvements in federal and tribal governmental
services.
The broader normative justifications for the tribal selfdetermination policy lie in classical liberal political theory and moral
philosophy, but the specific details have been worked out in the political milieu of federal Indian policy. Though the normative justifications are idealistic and profound, the benefits are intensely practical.
The broad consensus is that tribal self-determination contracting has
dramatically improved federal services to Indian people.
Why does tribal self-determination deliver services more effectively
than the old model characterized by federal control? In part, it is because tribal officials have a significant comparative advantage over
federal officials in understanding and meeting the needs of Indian
country: they are more accountable to tribal constituents, more knowledgeable about tribal problems and culture, and, significantly, can often provide federal services more economically and more efficiently
than the federal government.
In addition to these practical and comparative advantages of tribal
governments, numerous less tangible factors are also at play. For example, minor policy decisions are presumably made every day in the
operation of government programs. Unlike federal employees and federal policies, which naturally tend to a more uniform, national approach, tribal officials can make their own implementation decisions.
Indeed, some of these decisions need not be uniform across the country
but can be made slightly differently on different reservations. Tribal
officials who have made their own implementation decisions are more
likely to be invested in the success of these programs. Moreover, a
federal program may simply work better with more flexibility and localized decisionmaking.
Routine tribal operation of federal programs has also had salubrious effects on tribal governments. Through running federal programs,
tribes have not only become much more sophisticated in providing
services, but also have improved tribal capacities for responsible administration, such as budgeting, enforcing internal controls, and undergoing audits. In other words, the growth in tribal administrative
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and governmental capacity has produced significant secondary benefits
beyond simply the contracted federal programs.
Moreover, tribes are becoming much more invested in tribal governance and administration. For years, tribal governments blamed
federal entities for continuing social problems on Indian reservations.
Since the federal government asserted its own trust responsibility for
Indians while simultaneously weakening and undermining tribal governments, the blame was righteous.
Now that tribes are much more empowered, tribal leaders continue
to complain about failures of the federal government in meeting the
trust responsibility, but they are much more likely to address the criticism constructively with genuine efforts to solve reservation problems
themselves. Moreover, since tribes are more committed to providing
direct services to their people, they are more willing to direct their own
financial resources toward those services, like education, that have
been promised them in treaties or under the trust responsibility. The
result is a virtuous cycle in which tribes have earned more responsibility and power from the federal government and, in turn, they have risen to the occasion for their own people and continued to improve.
II. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS
TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE COURTS

IN THE

The renaissance in tribal self-governance is, of course, new. For
most of American history, the federal trust responsibility embodied paternalism. The notion of the “trust responsibility” to Indian tribes
dates from Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinions in a series of foundational American Indian law cases, now known as the Marshall trilogy.28 He famously characterized the relationship between the United
States and tribes as a guardian-ward relationship.29 While Chief Justice Marshall recognized tribes as “nations,” he viewed them as inferior
“domestic” nations “dependent” on the United States for their existence
and protection.30 Chief Justice Marshall divined his formulation of the
trust responsibility from international law and early federal statutes,
such as the Indian Trade and Intercourse laws, which federalized relations with Indian tribes and provided for significant federal oversight
of trade with Indians.31
Since the Marshall era, the trust doctrine has been “one of the cornerstones of Indian law.”32 Applying the doctrine, the Supreme Court
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
28 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
29 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 17–18.
32 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 5, § 5.04[3][a], at 412.
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has held the United States to “the most exacting fiduciary standards.”33
The Supreme Court and the lower courts have thus sometimes provided a modest check on American political ambitions related to manifest
destiny and provided some comfort to tribes with rights recognized in
laws, treaties, and broader notions of justice.
The political branches, for their part, have implemented the trust
responsibility in a multitude of federal statutes that now constitute five
full volumes of the United States Code bearing the word “Indians” on
their spines. Many of these statutes, especially the early ones, infantilized Indians and Indian tribes, treating them as wards of the federal
officials who should make most of the important decisions for them.
In nineteenth-century Indian policy, the President was sometimes
characterized as the Great White Father, furthering the paternalistic
nature of this relationship.
Courts have enforced these paternalistic laws and sometimes have
also served as the conscience of the nation in its dealing with Indian
tribes. The courts insured that many of the nation’s legal promises to
Indian tribes were met, even when it was politically unpopular to do
so. To be sure, the courts enforced American promises imperfectly and
inconsistently, but they have often protected tribes when political actors failed. Consider, for example, the Sioux Nation case in which
tribes sued the United States for the taking of the Black Hills and
were awarded what was then the largest judgment against the federal
government in United States history.34 Or consider the fishing rights
cases of the 1970s in which federal courts protected the treaty fishing
rights of tribes and tribal members in the Midwest and the Pacific
Northwest,35 and the 1999 Supreme Court decision upholding the offreservation hunting, fishing, and gathering rights of the Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians.36
In the last fifty years, as noted above, federal Indian policy has undergone dramatic changes. Tribes have increasingly been recognized
as self-governing sovereigns that can make their own decisions. These
developments have raised a new question: what is the role of the Great
White Father and the courts in this new era?
Tribal governmental advancements have disrupted the longstanding formulation of the trust doctrine and have reconfigured the judicial
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
33
34

Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942).
See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (affirming $106 million
judgment against the United States in favor of the Sioux Nation); see also EDWARD LAZARUS,
BLACK HILLS/WHITE JUSTICE: THE SIOUX NATION VERSUS THE UNITED STATES, 1775
TO THE PRESENT 381–402 (1991).
35 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020, 1028 (W.D. Wash. 1978); see also
CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 157–
73 (2005).
36 Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 176 (1999).
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role in the trust responsibility. In a series of cases, most notably, the
United States v. Mitchell cases of the early 1980s and a pair of 2003
cases, United States v. Navajo Nation37 and United States v. White
Mountain Apache Tribe,38 the Supreme Court set aside the broader
moral context of the relationship between the federal government and
tribes and employed a much narrower approach in interpreting whether there is a legally enforceable federal trust responsibility to tribes.
In United States v. Mitchell39 (Mitchell I), the Court found that an
Indian trust statute was not sufficient to create an enforceable fiduciary responsibility even if it specifically included the legal term of art
“trust.”40 In a later opinion in the same case (Mitchell II41), however,
the Court recognized that a specific statutory and regulatory regime
that gave the government pervasive and comprehensive control over
tribal resources was sufficient to establish a legally enforceable trust
responsibility.42 The Court clarified that money damages for breach of
trust are available only if a law establishes a “substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages”43 and the
plaintiff cites a source of law that is relatively clear in mandating
compensation.44
In sum, the Mitchell cases clarified that neither the general historic
federal trust relationship with tribes nor the bare trust created by the
government’s ownership of “trust” lands created an enforceable trust
responsibility. However, statutes establishing a regulatory regime with
active and pervasive federal management of tribal resources could create an enforceable trust claim. But the outcomes of that framework at
that time may have been limited because the Mitchell cases were decided when federal control of reservation remained pervasive.45 At
that time, nascent efforts toward tribal governance of trust resources
were only beginning to gain footing.46
By the early 2000s, tribal self-governance efforts were well under
way and federal policy began to exhibit ambivalence about the paternalistic and protective role of the federal government. In Navajo
Nation, the Supreme Court further clarified the scope of the trust responsibility. In that case, the Navajo Nation had undertaken the re–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

537 U.S. 488 (2003).
537 U.S. 465 (2003).
445 U.S. 535 (1980).
Id. at 542.
United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
Id. at 224.
Id. at 216 (quoting Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 538).
Id. at 216–19.
See Washburn, supra note 9, at 790 (discussing contemporary portrayals of “the BIA’s dominant role on Indian reservations”).
46 Id. at 790–91.
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sponsibility, under a statute that fostered tribal self-governance, to negotiate royalties for coal from a coal mining company.47 Though the
tribe could negotiate the rate, only federal officials could formally approve it.48 Thus, the federal government retained some power to oversee the economic relationship and protect the tribal interest.
In an episode that became embarrassing for the federal government, the coal company sought and received a private meeting with
the Secretary of the Interior, Donald Hodel.49 In a letter to the Secretary and in the private meeting (without the Tribe present), the coal
company lobbied the Secretary to reject the Tribe’s negotiated increase
and to send the parties back to the negotiating table.50 The Secretary,
through a deputy, informed the parties that he would not immediately
decide an appeal raised by the coal company.51 Facing severe economic pressure and the prospect that the very low existing rate would continue indefinitely, the Tribe agreed to accept a statutory minimum royalty rate.52
When the Tribe learned of the secret political influence, it brought
a breach of trust action against the United States, citing Secretary
Hodel’s meeting and actions.53 Condemning the Secretary’s conduct,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found a
breach of trust and ordered a determination of damages owed the
Tribe.54 The Supreme Court, however, reversed.55 It found no statutory requirement that the Secretary act in the Tribe’s best interest.56
How could the trustee avoid the requirement to act in the beneficiary’s best interest? In explaining its opinion, the Supreme Court
highlighted the new legal environment spawned by federal policies favoring tribal self-determination. Noting that the relevant statute
sought to “enhance tribal self-determination by giving the Tribe[]” the
“lead role in negotiating mining leases,” the Court noted that “the ideal
of Indian self-determination” is “directly at odds with Secretarial control over leasing.”57 It appeared to the Court that the freight train of
tribal self-determination had rolled over and killed the federal trust responsibility.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 495–96 (2003).
Id. at 494–95.
Id. at 497.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 498–500.
Id. at 500.
Navajo Nation v. United States, 263 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 514.
Id. at 507–08.
Id. at 508 (quoting Navajo Nation v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 217, 230 (2000)).
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In White Mountain, which was handed down on the same day as
Navajo Nation, the Supreme Court showed, however, that the trust responsibility was narrowed but not dead. The Court found federal liability in circumstances of pervasive and exclusive federal control of
Indian property.58 In this case, the federal government had used
Indian trust property for its own purposes and had allowed the buildings that were part of the trust corpus to fall into utter disrepair.59
The Court found that the federal government’s actual use of the property, to the exclusion of the tribal owners, was sufficient to make the
federal government responsible for damages it caused.60
Taken together, White Mountain and Navajo Nation suggest that
the federal government will continue to be accountable to tribes if it
has retained wholesale control over Indian resources, but is much less
accountable if it has surrendered a measure of power. In other words,
it seems that the trust responsibility exists, but only in situations in
which tribal self-determination does not.
The Court’s understanding in Navajo Nation that “Indian selfdetermination is at odds with Secretarial control” deserves greater attention.61 The two concepts certainly coexist uneasily. The so-called
plenary power of Congress in Indian affairs is generally justified on
the basis of paternalism — the notion that Indian tribes need the federal government to protect their interests.62 One wonders why
Congress sought to preserve secretarial control through the secretarial
approval power, if that power could be used in such a manner. Indeed, in this instance, the Secretary’s actions undermined both the
trust responsibility and tribal self-determination. The Secretary failed
to act in the best interest of the tribe as a trustee and also harmed
tribal self-governance by undermining the Tribe’s negotiation position.
The tension between the federal trust responsibility and the idea of
tribal self-governance is natural. Power, it is sometimes said, is a zerosum game.63 And thus, the significant question remains whether the
trust responsibility has any value to tribes if tribes are subject to federal control for which the federal government is not legally accountable. Put bluntly, is the trust responsibility of any continuing value?

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 475–76 (2003).
Id. at 469–70 & 470 n.2.
Id. at 474–76.
Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 508 (quoting Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 230).
See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust
Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1550. See generally Gover, supra note 27.
63 The idea, if not in these specific terms, was discussed by political theorist Thomas Hobbes.
See THOMAS HOBBES, The ELEMENTS OF LAW: NATURAL AND POLITIC 26 (Ferdinand
Tönnies ed., Cambridge University Press 1928 (1640)).
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III. THE TRUST RESPONSIBILITY TODAY
The trust responsibility grew out of an assumption famously advanced by Chief Justice Marshall that tribal governments were “nations” but that Indian people were inferior to Americans.64 Because it
is rooted in paternalism, the trust responsibility seems anachronistic in
an era of robust tribal self-governance. Perhaps, in this way, the Court
was correct to note this inherent tension in Navajo Nation.65 As the
government-to-government relationship between the United States and
tribes becomes more robust and tribal governments become more empowered, tribes no longer need the “protection” of the federal government as a trustee. That paternalistic control, however, is merely one
aspect of the trust responsibility.
The inconvenient fact is that the United States continues to occupy
Indian lands. While the paternalistic aspects of the trust responsibility
are no longer justified, if they ever were, the moral obligations of the
United States owed for taking Indian lands are as great as ever. Indeed, today, the trust responsibility has come to represent something
else entirely. It is to the modern and more useful conceptions of the
trust responsibility that this Essay now turns.
A striking change in federal Indian policy during the last several
decades has been the strong federal support for the resurgence of tribal
self-governance. Tribes have persisted, and indeed, have often agitated
for more power. But, in recent years, the federal government has
sometimes offered them even more than they sought. Consider the political situation facing a tribal leader around criminal justice issues.
Most Indian tribes can be characterized as poor, minority communities.66 It may not be good political strategy for the tribe’s leader to
seek more power to imprison his own people. Thus, it was not primarily tribal leaders but Indian activists and, in part, federal officials who
sought greater tribal criminal justice authority for tribes. After decades of possessing only misdemeanor criminal sentencing authority,
felony criminal jurisdiction was restored to tribes in 2010.67 Another
exhibit in the evolution in federal Indian policy is the United States’s
acceptance of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.68 This international instrument strengthens notions of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
64 See Wood, supra note 62, at 1498 & n.123 (describing two sides to the trust responsibility,
one representing a “sovereign trusteeship,” id. at 1498, designed to preserve tribal sovereignty, and
the other reflecting the paternalistic “guardian-ward relationship,” id. at 1498 n.123).
65 Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 508.
66 See Washburn, supra note 9, at 786 (identifying “the poverty on many Indian reservations”).
67 See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. VII, § 234, 124 Stat. 2258,
2279–81 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012)).
68 G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007)
[hereinafter U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People]; see President Barack Obama,
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tribal self-governance by recognizing collective rights of groups as human rights that are as important in many ways as individual rights.69
It is now clear that, through a gradual evolution in federal law and
policy, the federal trust responsibility has come to represent several
significant principles that are unrelated to ancient notions of paternalism. First, the trust doctrine now appears to encompass the obligation
to protect the inherent sovereignty that tribal governments never ceded. Second, it has begun to include the notion that the United States
should not interfere with internal tribal matters. Third, it now incorporates the understanding that the United States must never take an
action affecting Indian tribes without first consulting with them. Finally, it now covers the principal justification for robust fiscal support
for tribal governments. Today, the trust responsibility, in effect, constitutes the obligation to foster and protect tribal self-governance. It is to
each of these subjects that this Essay now turns.
A. The Trust Responsibility as a Source
of Noninterference with Tribal Prerogatives
Federal support for tribal self-governance coincided with the development of an important norm designed to protect some of the prerogatives of tribes from second-guessing by federal decision makers.
This new federal approach might be called the “norm of noninterference with internal tribal governance.” The most significant expression
of this norm occurred at the dawn of the era of tribal selfdetermination in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.70
In Martinez, the Santa Clara Pueblo’s tribal government had enacted a tribal ordinance that allowed the children of Pueblo men to be
enrolled, even if the other parent was not a Pueblo member, but disallowed the enrollment of children of Pueblo women who had married
outside the Pueblo.71 Julia Martinez brought a civil rights action
against the Pueblo for refusing to enroll her children, whose father was
Navajo.72 Against compelling claims of gender discrimination, Justice
Thurgood Marshall’s majority opinion noted that “[a] tribe’s right to
define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political communi-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Remarks by the President at the White House Tribal Nations Conference (Dec. 16, 2010),
https :// w w w. whi teh ouse .g ov /th e- press- of fice /2 0 1 0 /1 2/ 16/ rem arks- p residen t- whi te -h ouse -tri bal
-nations-conference [https://perma.cc/8TLG-725U].
69 See U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 68.
70 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
71 See id. at 52.
72 See id. at 52–53.

2017]

WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS

215

ty.”73 Consequently, the court rejected federal “interference with tribal
autonomy and self-government” in such matters.74
Martinez reflected an agonizing clash of competing values. In
Martinez, the principle of noninterference with tribal sovereignty prevailed over legitimate and important concerns related to human rights
and gender equality.
Martinez has come to reflect the notion, widely respected in the
courts, that the federal trust responsibility creates a high fence around
a significant policy space where tribes are entitled to make their own
decisions and retain the last word. The policy space is most protected
by this norm when the matters at issue are purely internal or have a
significant effect on the tribe’s existence or identity.75
In sum, the trust responsibility has come to include a new norm
against federal interference with tribal decisions. This norm, though
controversial from a human rights point of view,76 is key to reversing
the old paternalistic approach to the trust responsibility, in which a
federal executive branch official or a federal court could overrule a
tribal government for its own good.
B. The Trust Responsibility, the Government-to-Government
Relationship, and Consultation
Tribes have long had a governmental relationship with the United
States. What are treaties, after all, but agreements between sovereigns
describing a government-to-government relationship? The United
States ratified approximately 370 treaties with tribes in the nineteenth
century.77 The vast imbalance of power between these sovereigns was
always part of the context of those treaties, but that imbalance is
changing as tribes have developed governing norms employing the
same tokens of legitimacy reflected in state and local governments,
such as regular elections, career administrators, governments with separation of powers, and robust courts.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Id. at 72 n.32.
Id. at 59.
See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564–66 (1981) (recognizing tribal civil jurisdiction over tribal membership and domestic relations, and even over non-Indians in some circumstances if the conduct at issue “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe,” id. at 566).
76 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Whose Culture? A Case Note on Martinez v. Santa Clara
Pueblo, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 65–68 (1987); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian
Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 704–10 (1989).
77 DALIA TSUK MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE: FELIX S. COHEN AND THE
FOUNDING OF AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM 221 (2007).
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As discussed above, many tribes long ago outgrew the need for the
“federal control” aspects of the trusteeship.78 Chief Justice Marshall’s
“guardian-ward” relationship has been left behind. Today, the relationship between the United States and tribes is more often referred to
as a “government-to-government” relationship. It is a much more respectful relationship, characterized more by collaboration and cooperation than federal control.
In 2000, President Bill Clinton issued an executive order directing
agencies to engage in consultation and coordination with tribes in “the
development of Federal policies that have tribal implications.”79
Shortly after taking office, President Barack Obama further directed
each federal agency to develop its own individualized plan as to how it
would conduct such tribal consultations.80 Indeed, in an episode early
in the Obama Administration that no doubt delighted absurdists, each
federal agency was required to engage in tribal consultation even on
how to develop a plan on tribal consultation.81 Though the executive
mandate for consultation was not originally intended to be an enforceable legal requirement, the consultation norm seems to be gradually
morphing into law. Indeed, a handful of courts have engaged in nascent efforts to make the requirement enforceable and to evaluate the
quality of actual consultation to insure that it is meaningful.82 In addition, since 2009, tribal leaders have grown accustomed to annual meetings with the President and members of the cabinet.83
Today, tribal governments are much more involved in shaping federal policy affecting them. As a result, federal policy has improved.
Moreover, as tribal governments engage, they become more competent
in evaluating and affecting federal public policy. The result is another
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
78 See Gover, supra note 27, at 335 (“In large measure, Tribes and their members have been
relieved of the intrusive federal presence of the past with no withdrawal of federal support . . . .”).
79 Exec. Order No. 13,175, 3 C.F.R. 304 (2001).
80 Presidential Memorandum on Tribal Consultation, 50 Fed. Reg. 57,881 (Nov. 5, 2009).
81 See, e.g., Tribal Consultations, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,120 (Mar. 12, 2012).
82 See, e.g, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Jewell, 3:15-CV-03018, 2016 WL 4625672 (D.S.D.
Sept. 6, 2016); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1345–46 (D. Wyo.
2015) (“‘[W]henever DOI [Department of the Interior] plans or actions have tribal implications’
. . . DOI policies and procedures require extra, meaningful efforts to involve tribes in the decision-making process.” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL, 512
DM 4.4 (2015))), vacated as moot sub nom. Wyoming v. Sierra Club, No. 15-8136, 2016 WL
3853806 (10th Cir. July 13, 2016).
83 The Obama Administration annually invited the leader of each tribe to Washington, D.C.,
to meet with the President and members of the cabinet at an annual White House Tribal Nations
Conference. The first occurred in November of 2009, and the eighth in September of 2016. In
addition, in 2013, President Obama issued an executive order establishing the White House
Council on Native American Affairs, composed of the leaders of each of the cabinet agencies, such
as Treasury, State, and Justice, and the various White House agencies, such as the Office of Management and Budget, to promote federal coordination in carrying out the federal trust responsibility to tribes. Exec. Order No. 13,647, 3 C.F.R. 311 (2013).
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virtuous circle: tribal governments engage; federal policy improves;
and tribal governments, in turn, become even more invested in the engagement. As a result of their invited involvement in the machinery of
federal policymaking, tribes are ever more politically engaged and
more astute.
One impact of the robust government-to-government approach is a
further transformation in the content of the trust responsibility itself.
Strong tribal input in shaping federal policy necessarily diminishes the
continuing paternalistic tendencies of that policy. The trust responsibility has quite simply come to embody much greater respect. Statutes
continue to reflect federal government decisionmaking and oversight
of tribes, but the trust responsibility now requires careful communication and consultation with tribes before such decisions are made.
Moreover, because the new norms around the government-togovernment relationship explicitly require consultation with tribes on
any policy matter that affects them,84 the trust responsibility has begun to escape the bounds of Indian policy. As governments and communities in the United States, Indian tribes are, of course, affected by
numerous general federal policies. The trust responsibility binds the
federal government to consult with tribes about policies even if Indian
tribes and people are not the primary target of such policies.
C. The Trust Responsibility and Adequate
Fiscal Support for Indian Tribes
While Chief Justice Marshall originally phrased the trust responsibility in terms that may call to mind the noblesse oblige of a perceived
superior culture to an inferior one, the responsibility sprang not from
any general duty from the rich to the poor, but clearly in Chief Justice
Marshall’s words from a landed people to those from whom the land
had been taken.85 In other words, the trust responsibility sprung directly from the recognition that the United States was founded on
Indian land. As the decades went on and manifest destiny unfolded,
tribes grudgingly ceded Indian land, often on the basis of generous
treaty promises that later went unfulfilled. For most of the time since
Chief Justice Marshall’s conception of the trust responsibility, there
has been a gap between what the United States has promised and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
84 See Exec. Order No. 13,175 § 3(c)(3), 3 C.F.R. at 305 (“When undertaking to formulate and
implement policies that have tribal implications, agencies shall . . . in determining whether to establish Federal standards, consult with tribal officials as to the need for Federal standards and
any alternatives that would limit the scope of Federal standards or otherwise preserve the prerogatives and authority of Indian tribes.”).
85 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Towards a Trust We Can Trust: The Role of the Trust Doctrine in
the Management of Natural Resources, in TRIBES, LAND, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7, 8–9
(Sarah A. Krakoff & Ezra Rosser eds., 2012) (discussing the various theories on the source and
meaning of the trust responsibility).
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what it has delivered.86 One might characterize the federal trust responsibility and annual appropriations as "rent" due Indian tribes for
the United States "occupying" Indian lands in North America.
One might ask whether the trust responsibility, to provide funding
to tribes to meet federal responsibilities, can continue as the more paternalistic “control” aspects of the trust responsibility diminish. The
answer is, “of course.” More modern American sentiment and rhetoric
suggest that the ongoing fiscal trust responsibility reflects general
compensation for moral wrongs, such as the loss of culture, homelands,
and sovereignty. It provides moral atonement to those directly affected by the yawning chasm between what the United States says about
itself as a moral and just nation and the wrongs that it committed
across the continent in the name of “manifest destiny.”
As tribal governments are gradually restored to their former status
as sovereigns in North America and their resources and tax bases are
restored, some of the moral justifications for compensation may eventually begin to diminish, but the general “rent” justification will not.87
Until the United States ceases to occupy North America and immigrants and their descendants return from whence they came, the
strong moral justification for federal funding of tribal governments
will continue.
Concomitant with the erosion of the enforceability of the trust doctrine in the courts, the trust doctrine has come to support something
much more important for tribes. Indeed, a more fundamental change
in federal Indian policy during the last several decades has been the
strong federal fiscal support for the resurgence of tribal self–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
86
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Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 38–43 (1947).
Indeed, for some tribes, the “rent” justification appeared explicitly in treaties. For example,
the Treaty with the Ottawa states:
It is hereby stipulated and agreed on the part of the United States, as a consideration for
the lands, ceded by the nations aforesaid, in the preceding article, that there shall be
paid to the said nations, at Detroit, ten thousand dollars, in money, goods, implements of
husbandry, or domestic animals, (at the option of the said nations, seasonably signified,
through the superintendent of Indian affairs, residing with the said nations, to the department of war,) as soon as practicable, after the ratification of the treaty, by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States; of this sum, three
thousand three hundred and thirty three dollars thirty three cents and four mills, shall
be paid to the Ottoway nation, three thousand three hundred and thirty three dollars
thirty three cents and four mills, to the Chippeway nation, one thousand six hundred sixty six dollars sixty six cents and six mills, to the Wyandotte nation, one thousand six
hundred sixty six dollars sixty six cents and six mills, to the Pottawatamie nation, and
likewise an annuity forever, of two thousand four hundred dollars, to be paid at Detroit,
in manner as aforesaid: the first payment to be made on the first day of September next,
and to be paid to the different nations, in the following proportions: eight hundred dollars to the Ottoways, eight hundred dollars to the Chippeways, four hundred dollars to
the Wyandottes, and four hundred dollars to such of the Pottawatamies, as now reside
on the river Huron of lake Erie, the river Raisin, and in the vicinity of the said rivers.
Treaty with the Ottawa, Etc., 1807, art. 2, Nov. 17, 1807, 7 Stat. 105 (emphasis added).
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governance. This support and the law underlying it have given rise to
a new aspect of a trust responsibility to tribes. Indeed, while the Supreme Court has viewed the rise in tribal self-governance as a justification for loosening the obligation of federal officials to act in the best
interest of tribes, the Court has been protective of specific fiscal promises to tribes in support of self-governance.
An example is Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter.88 Ramah was a
nationwide class action, originally filed in the early 1990s. The plaintiffs alleged that the United States had breached thousands of selfdetermination contracts by failing to pay full amounts due to tribes
The federal defense was that though
under those contracts.89
Congress had mandated the terms of the contracts and specified certain requirements that tribes be allowed administrative support costs
similar to what would have been incurred by the federal government,
Congress failed, year after year, to appropriate adequate sums to cover
those costs.90 After nearly twenty years of litigation, when the case
reached the Supreme Court, the Court found the federal government
liable for breach of contract. The Court unequivocally held that the
United States had a responsibility to pay tribes all the amounts it had
promised them in contracts.91
The outcome of Ramah was extraordinarily important for the success of the tribal self-determination contracting regime. Ramah serves
as an important counterbalance to Navajo Nation. While the Supreme
Court failed to protect tribes from misuse of the remaining vestiges of
federal control, it did require the political branches to keep their contractual promises to Indian tribes in support of tribal self-governance.
Thus, the trust responsibility has also come to be seen as reflecting a
norm that the federal government has an obligation to meet its own
explicit promises to tribal governments and to insure that they will receive the funding promised them to carry out federal trust functions
under contracts.
One of the most powerful practical justifications for tribal selfgovernance is fiscal prudence. Because of the success of selfgovernance programs, it is widely understood that the federal taxpayer
gets more value from each dollar spent when tribes are contracted to
run federal programs. Moreover, as the “control” aspect of the trust
responsibility has receded and given way to tribal self-governance, the
“funding” aspect of the trust responsibility has become even more important. Indeed, as tribal governments exercise greater power, the
need for financial support often becomes more acute. While tribal
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012).
Id. at 2188.
Id.
Id. at 2195.
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governments wish for control, they also aspire to excellence, or at least
competence. Neither can be achieved without adequate fiscal resources. If federal funding diminishes after tribes agree to take over
federal functions, the federal government will have off-loaded an important responsibility and left the scene, leaving tribes holding the
(empty) bag.
In Ramah and related cases,92 the Supreme Court has shown a
willingness to insure that tribal self-governance is adequately funded.
As a result, as tribal self-governance has flourished, another new norm
has come to animate our political understanding of the trust responsibility: the trust responsibility has become a fiscal principle as well as a
legal one. In sum, the United States has the moral, political, and
sometimes legal responsibility to provide adequate fiscal resources to
insure the success of federal programs run by tribes under tribal selfgovernance programs.
IV. CHALLENGES FOR THE TRUST
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE FUTURE
The diminishment of federal paternalistic control and simultaneous
expansion of tribal self-governance and authority have raised significant new issues that will pose challenges to the federal government
and to tribes and will continue to shape the trust responsibility in the
future. First, vestiges of the old, paternalistic trust responsibility mean
that tribal initiatives remain subject to federal approvals, which bring,
in turn, federal procedural requirements and federal judicial review.
While tribes can make strong arguments that such federal requirements undermine tribal self-governance, tribes are facing their own increased scrutiny and, sometimes, deficits in trust that will make further improvements in the trust responsibility harder to accomplish.
Several such challenges are discussed further below.
A. Residual Burdens of the Old, Paternalistic Trust Responsibility
Tribes today exist in a policy space that is betwixt and between the
old trust responsibility and the new. They have embraced selfgovernance and they exercise far more control over their own destinies, but they continue to carry the burdens of federal involvement
in — and federal approval of — many important decisions. Indeed,
for many tribes, Navajo Nation underscored some of the risks of taking over federal functions. In that case, the “trustee” had used its approval power to undermine the tribe’s negotiating position, causing the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
92 E.g., Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005) (holding that a tribal selfdetermination contract was binding on the federal government even though Congress failed to
appropriate funds for those costs).
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tribe to settle for a lower royalty rate than it could have achieved if the
Secretary had behaved in the best interest of the tribe, or even if the
Secretary had been denied any role at all. In that context, the tribal
self-determination provisions in the law provided only limited “selfdetermination,” and yet they shielded the trustee from liability for
wrongdoing. While Secretary Hodel’s reputation was tarnished when
the episode came to light, the U.S. government was not held accountable in any way for what appeared to be an inappropriate use of the
federal approval power.
Mitchell I and II, together with Navajo Nation and White Mountain, have placed tribes in a difficult position. These Supreme Court
decisions suggest that the trust responsibility to Indian tribes has narrowed considerably in the past thirty to forty years, as tribal selfgovernance has taken hold. Today, the trust responsibility is legally
enforceable through a suit for damages in only a narrow range of circumstances and perhaps not at all when the tribe is exercising its own
powers of self-governance. If the trust responsibility is generally not
enforceable in an action for damages, is there really any trust responsibility at all?
Without a doubt, Indian tribes would benefit from even less “Secretarial control” if Navajo Nation is an indication of how that control
will be exercised. The Navajo Nation was arguably mistreated by its
trustee, but had no recourse for that mistreatment. Navajo Nation left
tribes and lawyers more clear-eyed about the trust responsibility and
its ability to protect tribes in the era of tribal self-determination. Together, all of these cases suggest that the tribes can have little confidence in the trust responsibility alone to protect the tribe’s best interests, but they also demonstrate that a tribe undertakes serious risks
when it trusts the federal government’s oversight of tribal economic
decisions.
The Supreme Court has recognized more recently what has been
implicit all along: federal decisionmakers have their own policy goals
that may or may not be consistent with tribal goals.93 Beneficiary beware; it is now perhaps more clear than ever that the federal trustee
may or may not have the tribe’s best interests in mind when it makes
decisions.94 The government’s conflicts of interests, while real, are not
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
93 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 174–75 (2011) (noting that the trust
responsibility differs from an ordinary common law trust relationship in part because “the Government has often structured the trust relationship to pursue its own policy goals,” id. at 175).
94 See Reid Peyton Chambers, Compatibility of the Federal Trust Responsibility with SelfDetermination of Indian Tribes: Reflections on Development of the Federal Trust Responsibility in
the Twenty-First Century 27–28 (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Found., Working Paper 13A,
2005) (noting that the courts have been less inclined to “distinguish between the Secretary’s role
and duties to Indians under the trust responsibility and her roles and duties in other contexts as a
public official,” id. at 28).
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generally legally cognizable.95 In any event, the Navajo Nation episode reflects a weakening of the notion of the federal government as a
“trustee” for tribes.96
The statute in Navajo Nation was not unusual. Even in the era of
robust tribal self-governance, the federal government retains significant residual oversight of tribal economic decisionmaking. In part,
this is because many of the old paternalistic statutes remain on the
books.97 It is also because, even when amending such statutes to increase tribal control, Congress almost always preserves a continuing
federal role.98 Indeed, while many statutes have been amended to
eliminate the kind of pervasive federal control that can give rise to
federal liability, a strong residual federal role remains. In Indian gaming, for example, a tribe may negotiate a management contract with an
outside entity to manage a tribal casino, but under a statute enacted in
1988, the federal government must approve the management contract.99 What the cases now make clear is that the federal government
may not be legally accountable to tribes for misuse of this more limited
oversight power.100
For tribes, the residual federal role is even more troubling for a different reason. While tribal decisionmaking generally should be subject
to tribal decisionmaking norms and presumably should be subject to
challenge primarily in tribal forums, such as tribal courts, federal supervision of tribal decisions often brings a host of requirements for adherence to federal norms. For many of these actions, significant rules
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
95 Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The Department of Justice’s Conflict of Interest in Representing Native American Tribes, 37 GA. L. REV. 1307, 1344–45 (2003) (citing Nevada v. United
States, 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983)).
96 See supra p. 312.
97 See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 81(b) (2012) (requiring federal approval of encumbrances on Indian
lands); id. § 415 (requiring federal approval of leases of Indian lands).
98 See Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contract Encouragement Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-179, 114 Stat. 46 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 81).
99 25 U.S.C. § 2711.
100 To be sure, the United States remains politically accountable. More than a hundred cases
with tribes and Indian people were settled during the Obama Administration, amounting to nearly $10 billion in liability for the federal government. See, e.g., David Bennett, USDA/Keepseagle:
Settlement $680 Million, DELTA FARMPRESS (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.deltafarmpress.com
/government/usdakeepseagle-settlement-680-million [https://perma.cc/LLD4-5Z3S]; Editorial,
Candidate Obama Kept His Promise to Native Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), h t t p s : / /
www.nytimes.com/2016/09/30/opinion/candidate-obama-kept-his-promise-to-nativeamericans.html [https://perma.cc/ED6S-VB3G]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior, Secretary Jewell, Tribal Leaders Mark Enactment of Four Additional Water Rights Settlements for
Indian Country (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/secretary-jewell-tribal-leaders
- m a r k - e n a c t m e n t - f o u r - a d d i t i o n a l - w a t e r - r i g h t s [ h t t p s : / / p e r m a . c c / E 6 6 N - L X F T ] . In light of
Mitchell I and II and Navajo Nation, the settlements can fairly be said to represent the triumph
of justice over law. While the federal government committed compelling wrongs in each case, the
United States might have defended the cases in litigation for years with no certainty that tribes
would ever have obtained damages under the Mitchell-Navajo framework.
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attach to even limited federal involvement through numerous federal
procedural statutes. Consider that the National Environmental Policy
Act101 (NEPA) requires significant review and consideration of environmental consequences of proposed actions by federal officials, including, frequently, mere approvals of tribal initiatives.102 Compliance
with NEPA is required independently of the scope of any tribal environmental review that has already occurred,103 and it is often time intensive. As a result, NEPA is a burden on tribal projects; it necessarily
undermines tribal agility in pursuing new initiatives, particularly
around economic development.104
Moreover, decisions of federal officials also tend to be subject to review in federal courts under federal principles of administrative law,
such as the Administrative Procedure Act105 (APA).106 As a result, a
modest residual federal approval requirement coming at the end of a
long tribal planning process can become a lever for influencing outcomes of tribal initiatives, and sometimes a hook, through APA litigation to review the federal portion of the decision, to delay or stop the
project.
In sum, the residue of federal paternalism continues to pose significant obstacles for tribes. Despite significant improvements in tribal
self-governance, many tribal projects effectively continue to remain
federal projects as well, simply because a vestige of federal authority
continues to exist in an approval process. As a result, tribal governments often face obstacles that are unknown to state and local governments or the private sector.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
101
102
103

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012).
Id. § 4332.
See DIV. OF ENVTL. & CULTURAL RES. MGMT., BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, INDIAN
AFFAIRS NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (NEPA) GUIDEBOOK § 1.1 (2012) (“Because the majority of activities on Indian trust lands include Federal funding or approval through
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the responsibility for complying with NEPA generally falls to
the BIA.”).
104 One agency, the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC), has proposed to address this
issue in a modest way, by limiting the decisions to which NEPA applies in its realm. The NIGC
has the responsibility of approving management contracts between tribes and outside managers.
25 U.S.C. § 2711. In a draft NEPA Guidelines Manual issued in February 2015, the NIGC proposed a categorical exclusion for application of NEPA in this context, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING
COMM’N, NEPA GUIDELINES DRAFT § 3 (2015), h t t p s : / / w w w . n i g c . g o v / i m a g e s / u p l o a d s
/Tribal%20Consultation/Consultations2015/NEPA%20guidelines%20draft.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MJ66-WV3N], presumably on the theory that the NIGC’s limited role in approving who manages an Indian gaming operation does not justify major environmental review
since the identity of the manager of any given casino likely has very little effect on the environment.
105 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
106 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (stating that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review”); id. § 704 (defining which agency actions are reviewable); id. § 706 (defining the scope of review).
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Tribes can make compelling arguments that, in an era in which
tribal self-governance has become a widely respected norm, all of the
remaining vestiges of federal paternalism should be excised from the
U.S. Code and federal Indian policy. As the next section describes,
however, tribes may be victims of their own success. To some commentators, tribes’ increasing power and authority may justify more,
not less, scrutiny.
B. Increasing Scrutiny of Tribes May Slow
the Development of Self-Governance
Today, tribes are exercising real and significant powers. They are
making important decisions. But while tribal self-governance is a vast
improvement in the delivery of services in Indian country, the new approach presents new problems. As a result of the newly constituted
trust responsibility and the rise of tribal self-governance, the federal
government is no longer the only government working — and making
weighty decisions — in Indian country. In part precisely because the
new tribal self-governance model has been viewed as so successful in
reinvigorating tribal powers, tribes have begun to face increased
scrutiny.107
In short, tribes now must face the same social problems that the
federal government has tried for decades to address. It should be no
wonder that tribes will sometimes fail too. Perhaps because some of
the more difficult questions facing tribes under the new model might
be perceived as criticism, few scholars or federal policymakers have directly addressed many of the hard questions that have arisen under the
new model of federal policy in which tribal self-governance dominates.
Greater scrutiny of tribes, and, in some cases, criticism, is justified.
The federal government faces pressure too. For example, although
the federal “noninterference” norm has been crucial to the tribal renaissance, it has come under pressure as tribal governments have become more empowered. After all, tribal governments sometimes
commit wrongs too. It is not difficult to find instances of public outrage about actions committed by tribal governments involving their
own people.108 Controversies occur in a variety of policy spaces, from
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
107 The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity has been under relentless assault by litigants as
tribal governments act in more powerful ways. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134
S. Ct. 2024, 2028 (2014) (upholding tribal immunity); Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 751, 753 (1998) (same). Though the Supreme Court has continued to uphold tribal immunity against invitations to undermine it, the challenges continue. See Lewis v. Clark, 135 A.3d
677 (Conn. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016).
108 See, e.g., Craig Harris & Dennis Wagner, The Navajo Nation Accepted More than $1 Billion
for Houses. So, Where Did It Go?, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Dec. 14, 2016), h t t p : / / w w w . a z c e n t r a l . c o m
/stor y/news/local/arizona-i nves tigations/2016/ 12/ 14/nava j o-h ousi ng- fede ral -fu nds /94563354
[https://perma.cc/TYF6-SCD6].
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disenrollment of tribal members,109 to the kinds of problems that happen every day in state or federal governments, such as police violence,110 abuse of the public safety and criminal justice processes,111
and ordinary fiscal and political corruption.112 If tribes are making
decisions, tribes must, of course, be responsible for those decisions.
One question is how accountability should be achieved in this context.
Moreover, the issue is complicated by the legacy of past federal policies. In the Allotment era, the United States took land from tribes
and gave it to individual Indian people,113 some of whose heirs remain
tribal members. As the United States has forfeited policymaking space
back to tribes, the federal government continues to have a legal trust
responsibility to numerous individual Indians who own shares of allotted land that is held in trust by the federal government. These people,
the heirs of original Indian allottees, continue to number in the thousands or tens of thousands.114 How does the shift toward tribal selfgovernance affect these Indian people? Can the United States simultaneously have a robust and respectful government-to-government
relationship with tribes and yet come between tribes and its own
members when those members own interests in individual trust land?
Other serious questions are those that face any government. Some
of these arise from governmental failures. No government succeeds in
every endeavor. One needs only open the newspaper or a federal case
reporter to see that officials in the federal government, state governments, county and local governments, and, yes, tribal governments,
sometimes fail their people, and sometimes in the most important of
tasks.
Against the backdrop of the federal trust responsibility, however,
failures by tribal governments raise unique questions. One result of
the gradual expansion of the tribal sovereign sphere has been a blurring of the lines between what constitutes a federal responsibility and
what constitutes a tribal responsibility. Indeed, it is partly federal law
and federal resources that have empowered tribes and supported the
tremendous renaissance in tribal governments. As the federal govern–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
109 See, e.g., James Dao, In California, Indian Tribes with Casino Money Cast off Members,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/us/california-indian-tribes-eject
-thousands-of-members.html [https://perma.cc/GG2J-YBZ2].
110 See, e.g., Lisa Desjardins & Emma Lacey-Bordeaux, Problems of Liberty and Justice on the
Plains, CNN (Dec. 13, 2012, 11:36 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/10/us/embed-america-tribal
-justice [https://perma.cc/DK54-6TL4].
111 See id.
112 See, e.g., FBI Agent Helps Protect His Native American Community, FBI (Apr. 7, 2015),
https:// www.fbi .gov /n ews /stor ies/pu bl ic-corr up tion-i n-i nd ian -cou ntr y [h t tp s:// perm a.c c/ B 4VT
-YE86].
113 Developments in the Law — Indian Law, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1652, 1655 n.16 (2016).
114 See S. REP. NO. 106-361, at 31 (2000).

226

HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 130:200

ment increasingly seeks to empower tribes, the federal government arguably bears some responsibility for this action. Moreover, from decades of strong federal control and oversight of Indian tribes, Indian
people have been accustomed to turning to BIA officials when they are
mad about tribal decisions. In the past, the BIA sometimes obliged.115
This undermined tribal self-governance. Today, BIA officials are more
reluctant to interfere in internal tribal decisions, but this reluctance
means that Indian people may have nowhere to turn.
The problem is exacerbated because many tribal decisions today
necessarily involve higher stakes. The responsibility — and impact of
an error — in the criminal felony context, for example, is measurably
heavier than in the misdemeanor context. As tribes engage in governance more than ever before and become meaningful forces within the
regions they occupy, their actions and decisions naturally receive, and
perhaps deserve, more scrutiny and attention.
One practical response is that failures are inevitable in any government from time to time, and accountability of officials for those
failures is important. Presumably, if the community has the ability to
hold the responsible officials accountable, failures will occur more
rarely. When they do occur, tribal communities will be more content
to live with mistakes by their own elected officials than being forced
involuntarily to bear the mistakes of federal officials.
People who have often been supportive of tribal sovereignty as a
matter of justice have sometimes had second thoughts when they see
tribes exercising sovereign powers. Consider, for example, environmentalists who are upset by tribal natural resources development decisions,116 or human rights advocates troubled by tribal disenrollment.117
Thus, tribal empowerment raises myriad new questions that are
much easier to ask than to answer. Since the federal government underwrites some tribal governmental activities, what is the responsibility of the United States in addressing injustices committed by tribal
governments? If a tribe errs while exercising a federal function under
tribal self-determination, such as law enforcement, what remains of
the federal government’s trust responsibilities after the tribe has signed
a self-determination contract and taken responsibility for a given federal function? Is the federal obligation simply to pay the tribe accord–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
115 See generally Robert McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal Trust Obligation to American Indians, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 4–14, 39–40 (2004).
116 See, e.g., Dennis Wagner, Navajos Assail Environmentalists, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Oct. 1, 2009,
12:00 AM), http://archive.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/2009/09/30/20090930navajo
-enviro.html [https://perma.cc/542D-M2W3].
117 See generally Gabriel S. Galanda & Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Curing the Tribal Disenrollment
Epidemic: In Search of a Remedy, 57 ARIZ L. REV. 383 (2015) (providing an in-depth exploration
of the “realities of disenrollment,” id. at 387 (footnote omitted)).
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ing to the terms of the contract, or is there a broader, residual responsibility that continues in effect? Is the federal government a backstop,
or a guarantor that Indian people receive the services required by the
trust responsibility, even if the tribe performs the services poorly or
fails entirely to perform them? In other words, if the United States
has contracted with tribes to meet federal trust responsibilities, which
government should be held morally and legally accountable if the trust
responsibility is not met? Put another way, does the federal obligation
run only to the tribe or beyond the tribe to the ultimate beneficiaries,
its citizens? These questions are beginning to arise in a number of different contexts.
1. The Disenrollment Crisis. — A particularly vexing problem in
recent years has been the human rights crisis in Indian country related
to disenrollment of tribal members.118 Reports of tribes disenrolling
members have provoked a conversation among some commentators
about whether the advances in tribal self-governance and the concomitant withdrawal of federal power have gone too far. Appalled by the
actions of tribal governments and sympathetic to those who have been
disenrolled, some commentators have urged federal officials, and federal courts, to address unjust tribal actions.119
Tribal membership decisions, since at least the 1970s, have been
viewed as crucial to tribal identity and thus central to tribal sovereignty. Following the clear Supreme Court precedent in Martinez, federal
courts have respected the norm of federal noninterference in tribal
membership decisions.120 That decision has always been controversial.121 Many commentators, even some who are very supportive of
tribal sovereignty, would have preferred that the federal courts accept
a role as an active forum for tribal violations of human rights.122 Others have been appropriately skeptical of the value of reinvolving the
federal government in internal tribal disputes after working so hard to
restore a semblance of tribal sovereignty and self-governance, even if
important questions of tribal human rights are at stake.123
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
118 See, e.g., id. at 404–08; David E. Wilkins, Exiling One’s Kin: Banishment and Disenrollment in Indian Country, 17 WESTERN LEGAL HIST. 235, 258–62 (2004).
119 See, e.g., Galanda & Dreveskracht, supra note 117, at 453–73.
120 See Aguayo v. Jewell, 827 F.3d 1213, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016) (declining to interfere in an enrollment question and quoting a federal official saying that “in the exercise of sovereignty and
self-governance, tribes have the right, like other governments, to make good decisions, bad decisions, and decisions with which others may disagree”).
121 See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 76, at 63–69; Resnik, supra note 76, at 672–80; Carla
Christofferson, Note, Tribal Court’s Failure to Protect Native American Women: A Reevaluation of
the Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169, 170 (1991).
122 See, e.g., Galanda & Dreveskracht, supra note 117, at 462–73.
123 Professor Wenona Singel, for example, has thoughtfully suggested the formation of an intertribal human rights regime. Wenona T. Singel, Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability,
49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 567, 611–25 (2012).
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Several decades after Martinez, recent tribal disenrollments have
reignited the question at the heart of Martinez, to wit: should the federal government interpose itself between Indians and their tribal governments and serve as the guarantor of human rights against tribal
governments? The old notions of the importance of such decisions to
core tribal sovereignty remain substantial. In light of the ongoing and
seemingly insoluble immigration debate in the United States, can one
imagine the federal government forfeiting its own citizenship decisions
to another sovereign? Related questions of immigration and residency
played into a potentially disastrous move toward Britain’s exit from
the European Union.
Today, in Indian country, however, the context is different than it
was in 1978 when Martinez was decided. First, to some, the stakes
seem higher because money is involved. For tribes who make per capita payments to members, the payments can be thousands or tens of
thousands of dollars annually per member. Money raises the stakes, at
least from an external perspective; the broader American society outside Indian country can more readily understand the impact of the loss
of tribal membership when it is accompanied by the loss of material
wealth. Second, some claim that the motives for disenrollment are to
enrich the remaining members’ share of gaming revenues and increase
per capita payments.124 Finally, because significant money is sometimes at stake, disenrollment today is more likely to be noticed and
bring lawyers and formal judicial processes.125
Because of the apparent injustice and outrageous actions of some
tribes, efforts to use federal forums to resolve such claims will continue, if only because opponents are frustrated at their inability to obtain
action at the tribal level. The federal government has gradually recognized a greater quantum of tribal sovereignty for each tribe. Tribes
are becoming fuller and more complete sovereign governments. If
tribes are to be true sovereigns, they absolutely must have the freedom
to make mistakes and to make policy choices that other sovereigns
might find offensive. Some of these may constitute human rights vio–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
124 See, e.g., Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, If You Build It, They Will Come: Preserving Tribal
Sovereignty in the Face of Indian Casinos and the New Premium on Tribal Membership, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 311, 313–14 (2010). This claim may reflect a lack of familiarity with
tribal politics. At least since the arrival of Europeans, tribal politics has been a blood sport; disenrollment may simply be a new way of harming a bitter rival.
125 In other ways, however, the current claims for federal involvement are much less compelling than in Martinez. For the gaming tribes that are engaging in disenrollment, the money at
issue is not federal money. It is tribal money earned in gaming, an activity authorized by inherent
tribal authority and only grudgingly allowed by federal law. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166–1168 (2012);
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2012); California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). Thus, a potentially strong legal justification for federal interference is absent.
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lations. But even nation-states are sometimes subject to external influence for violations of international human rights norms.
However, the trust responsibility is a somewhat elastic concept, especially to those tribes without treaties explicitly clarifying federal duties. If a tribe has been restored to a fuller form of sovereignty, and it
chooses to exercise that sovereignty in a manner that is deemed offensive to federal policymakers, a political question arises: does the trust
responsibility require federal taxpayers to continue providing funding
to a sovereign government that commits human rights violations?
This question is similar to one that frequently arises in American foreign policy. In sum, for tribes engaging in disenrollment in what appears to be an unjust manner, perhaps the United States should recognize the tribal right to take such action, while also reserving the right
to assert diplomatic consequences, which could be fiscal in nature,
equivalent to international economic sanctions, or political in nature,
such as loss of federal recognition.
2. Public Safety and Criminal Justice. — Similar difficult questions arise in the area of public safety and criminal justice. Police
work is the rare instance in which violence (against suspected or convicted offenders) is officially sanctioned. Outside of war, no governmental power is more profound and potentially offensive and harmful,
or as controversial. Indeed, wrongful killings by police officers have
created a serious atmosphere of crisis in the United States. No area of
public policy involves higher stakes and greater interest by citizens.
On many Indian reservations, law enforcement is provided by federal officers. Where tribal law enforcement exists, it is commonly underwritten by the BIA through tribal self-determination contracts and
grants from the Department of Justice. Throughout Indian country, in
other words, tribal law enforcement is supported by federal appropriations. Indeed, for some purposes, tribal police officers working under
such contracts are considered federal officers. Because of the potentially violent nature of law enforcement, questions frequently arise as
to official liability for wrongful actions taken by law enforcement
officers.
In this area, the blurred lines between tribal and federal authority
produce complex questions. If the federal government has contracted
with a tribal government to provide law enforcement services to its
own people on an Indian reservation, should the federal government
provide a forum to a tribal citizen harmed by a tribal officer? Would
such a forum be consistent with tribal sovereignty? And aside from
the forum question, which government, tribal or federal, should bear
the cost of any official liability for death or harm?
As a result of federal laws recognizing inherent tribal authority for
prosecutions, and more recently authorizing felony criminal prosecutions and limited prosecution of non-Indians, some tribal judicial decisions in the criminal context are subjected to regular scrutiny by fed-
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eral courts. In these areas of federal Indian policy, federal judicial
scrutiny, including by habeas corpus proceedings, is authorized by federal law.126
Laws authorizing greater criminal justice authority have had the
effect of making federal interference with tribal action more routine.
Routine federal review of tribal judicial decisions may, over the long
term, erode the principle of federal noninterference with internal tribal
matters. Thus, tribal governments that now possess greater sovereign
power are also facing greater scrutiny. To exercise greater sovereignty,
they necessarily must accept limits to the scope of tribal sovereignty
and also accept outside interference by the federal government. These
new criminal provisions reflect political compromises as to the scope of
tribal sovereignty enacted into federal law.
3. Allottees. — Another area for which the tribal renaissance poses
new questions relates to the Indian heirs of original allottees of Indian
lands. At the beginning of the twentieth century, millions of acres of
land were taken from Indian tribes under federal laws, such as the
General Allotment Act,127 and “allotted” to individual Indians in parcels of various sizes in an effort to turn Indian families into farmers or
ranchers. During the Allotment era, more than 100 million acres were
ultimately taken from tribes, through allotment or sales of surplus
lands after each tribal adult member or head of household was deemed
to have obtained an allotment.128 On the heels of the Allotment era
followed the Great Depression, as well as the Dust Bowl in the western United States. As a result, soon after individual Indians became
landowners, many of them lost their lands, due to poverty resulting in
tax sales. The allotment policy was formally rejected during the New
Deal era and no more allotments were made, but by then the loss of
land was devastating.129 The allotment policy is widely viewed by
Indian policymakers and historians as disastrous for the loss of land to
tribes and Indian people.
Today, however, more than ten million of the original ninety million
acres lost to tribes continue to be owned by the heirs of the original
allottees.130 These parcels of land are held in trust for these heirs by
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
126 See, e.g., Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (enumerating various civil rights
tribal governments owe to their people).
127 Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
128 S. REP. NO. 106-361, at 31 (2000) (“A direct result of the [General Allotment Act] was the
loss of over 100,000,000 acres of land from the Indian trust land base between 1887 and 1934.”).
129 Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479); see also INST. FOR GOV’T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM
OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928).
130 ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED 170 (2006)
(“Allotment continues to have a major impact in Indian country today. . . . Individual Indians
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the federal government, with many of the parcels held by dozens or
hundreds of owners in undivided interests. Because the land is held in
trust by the federal government, the United States has a direct legal
responsibility to these beneficiaries.
Clashes between individual landowners and the government regulators who would create land use rules, such as zoning restrictions, are
common in local governments and are more routine than profound.
One key aspect of the tribal renaissance has been much greater deference to tribal decisions about land use and management on Indian reservations.131 As tribal self-governance has increased, the interests of
the individual heirs of allotments have sometimes clashed with the interests and priorities of the tribes, in the same way a small private
landowner’s interest may clash with county zoning rules and in the
same way individual tribal interests once clashed with federal interests.132 Restrictions on the use of lands can have economic implications, as such rules tend to lower the value of the land and limit the
productive uses of the land.133 In Indian country, the federal government’s support for tribal sovereignty and self-governance has the very
real potential impact of lowering the value of land in trust for individuals. In such a case, the federal government’s more general trust responsibility to support tribal governments runs into its narrow but
concrete trust responsibility to heirs of allottees for whom it continues
to hold land in trust.
Many, but not all, of the heirs of allottees are members of the tribe
on whose reservation the land is located. Those heirs presumably have
a voice in tribal government, alleviating the impact of the conflict to
some degree, but questions about the federal duties to governments
and federal duties to individual Indians remain. As economic development improves in Indian country, these problems will potentially
arise more often.
CONCLUSION
The federal trust responsibility has evolved from a paternalistic obligation to care for Indian people to a tool protecting the boundaries of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
own about 10.2 million acres of land on reservations left over from the individual allotments of
the Allotment era.”).
131 See, e.g., Final Rule for Residential, Business and Wind and Solar Resource Leases on
Indian Land, 77 Fed. Reg. 72,440 (Dec. 5, 2012) (codified in scattered sections of 25 C.F.R. pt. 162
(2016)) (providing “greater deference to tribes for tribal land leasing decisions”).
132 See, e.g., Jessica A. Shoemaker, Complexity's Shadow: American Indian Property, Sovereignty and the Future, 115 MICH. L. REV. 487, 513–17 (2017) (discussing the costs of federal and
other governmental regulation on individual Indian landowners).
133 Jessica A. Shoemaker, No Sticks in My Bundle: Rethinking the Indian Land Tenure Problem, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 383, 439–44 (2015).
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tribal governmental authority to provide that care itself. But the evolution is incomplete. Moreover, new conflicts and questions are inevitable as the power of tribal governments grows and tribes flex more
governmental authority. The questions arising from tribal power will
be answered in many different contexts and under different sets of
rules. For some of the questions, guideposts already exist. For others,
federal policymakers and judges have sometimes been left to construct
answers on an ad hoc basis by muddling through specific laws and
facts that fail to account for broader and more modern principles, such
as norms of respect for tribal sovereignty.
As the formerly paternalistic trust responsibility gives way to a new
federal policy favoring tribal self-governance, the role of the federal
government on Indian reservations will continue to be debated and
modified. During the coming decades, federal policymakers and courts
will be forced to decide, in a range of areas, whether the federally supported tribal renaissance justifies more federal oversight of tribal decisions or, in the alternative, stronger allegiance to norms of respect for
tribal sovereignty.

